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1DURATION OF COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE DUE TO EMERGING
TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
By
Theophanis C. Stratopoulos
tstratopoulos@uwaterloo.ca
University of Waterloo
Abstract: The objective of this study is to provide a framework for predicting the expected duration of a
competitive advantage due to adoption of an emerging technology, and suggest a process for generating
technology specific benchmark of expected duration for the average adopting firm. Our framework
integrates elements from the technology adoption (diffusion) cycle, hype cycles of emerging technologies,
and the resource based view conceptualization of number of firms associated with a perfectly competitive
market equilibrium. The objective of this synthesis is to generate a framework for estimating average
technology diffusion time and standard deviation. Given the prevailing assumption that technology
diffusion follows an approximate bell shaped distribution, we can use these two values to estimate the
duration of a technology adoption related competitive advantage. We demonstrate the empirical estimation
of expected duration of competitive advantage for an emerging technology (cloud computing) and a mature
one (ERP).
Keywords: Technology adoption, competitive advantage, duration, RBV, hype cycle
1. Introduction
Data analytics, big data, cloud computing, and internet of things are just a few of the
recent technological innovations. A total of 236 emerging technologies were identified by
Gartner Inc., over the period 2003 to 2015.  The rate of adoption of new technologies has
significant implications for adopting firms, suppliers of these technologies, and investors.
Some of these technologies have the potential to disrupt the competitive landscape and
provide adopting firms a competitive advantage. The objective of this study is to provide
a framework for predicting the expected duration of competitive advantage due to
adoption of an emerging technology, and suggest a process for generating technology
specific predictions of expected duration for the average firm.
2This study builds on prior literature on technology adoption/diffusion and the resource
based view. The early literature on diffusion of innovations, i.e., the process by which an
innovation spreads across a population of adopters, is based on the work of Rogers
(1995).1 In his original work, Rogers approaches diffusion as a decision driven by pursuit
of efficiency or profitability. Rogers examined a population of potential adopters to
determine the rate and pattern of adoption, as well as characteristics of the emerging
technology and its adopters. Rogers’ original approach - which is also known as the
economic-rationalistic approach (Cyert and March 1992) - was criticized for its pro-
innovation bias.  Several subsequent studies focused on fad/fashion based diffusion
(Abrahamson 1991; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993), i.e., adoption that is driven by
the number and reputation of previous adopters (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and
Powell 1983).  The Gartner Hype Cycle (Gartner n.d.), which originated from the
professional community, combines elements of hype (fad/fashion) driven early adoption
with subsequent post-hype rational adoption to capture the diffusion of emerging
technologies in business applications. While the role of a firm as a technology adopting
entity is central in this literature, the expected duration of technology adoption related
competitive advantage is at best tangentially addressed.
In strategic management literature, the resource based view (RBV) theorizes that the
source of a firm’s competitive advantage lies in its resources and capabilities (Wernerfelt
1984; Penrose 1995). If a firm possesses resources which are valuable and
heterogeneously distributed among competing firms, the firm would have a sustained
competitive advantage (Barney 1991; Dierickx and Cool 1989). The work of Mata et al.
(1995) introduced the resource based view in the context of the business value of
information technology (IT) literature, and provided the theoretical foundation of
empirical studies on sustainability of IT related competitive advantage. For example,
Dehning and Stratopoulos (2003) found that managerial IT skills are positively related to
the sustainability of competitive advantage due to IT enabled strategies. Lim et al. (2011)
examined firms that have been recognized for their IT innovation capability, and found
that IT innovation capability is path dependent, hence a source of sustainable competitive
1 The original work was published in 1962.
3advantage. However, studies with an explicit focus on payoffs due to adoption of
emerging technologies or capabilities associated with the adoption of these technologies,
either do not use on RBV to justify the duration advantage that they test (e.g., Hendricks
et al. 2007) or do not test the duration of competitive advantage (e.g., Zhu 2004).
In this study, we propose a synthesis/mapping of the technology adoption (diffusion)
cycle (Rogers 1995), the hype cycles of emerging technologies (Gartner n.d.), and the
resource based view conceptualization of number of firms associated with a perfectly
competitive market equilibrium (Lim et al. 2011; Barney 2002; Amit and Schoemaker
1993). The objective of this mapping/synthesis is to generate a framework for estimating
the average technology diffusion time and standard deviation. Given the prevailing
assumption that technology diffusion follows an approximate bell shaped distribution
(Rogers 1995), we can use these two values – in conjunction with RBV - to estimate the
duration of a technology adoption related competitive advantage.2 While the duration of
competitive advantage will vary across firms due to a host of firm specific factors, such
as the firm’s business strategy, innovation culture, organizational capabilities, and
investments in complementary resources, our objective is to estimate the competitive
advantage for the average adopting firm.
The main challenge is that of making predictions soon enough to make them useful
versus waiting until more evidence has been collected in order to make them more
accurate. This tradeoff is captured in the first set of our propositions (1a and 1b). The
former, with a focus on generating early predictions; proposes that observing two stages
of the hype cycle lets us predict one standard deviation of adoption time. The latter, with
a focus on accuracy, proposes that we have to wait until four stages of the hype cycle
have been observed to estimate two standard deviations of adoption time. The adoption
rate of an emerging technology is likely change dramatically due to certain events – e.g.,
the development of a complementary or competing technology, regulatory changes, or
changes in market conditions. With our second proposition, we recognize this possibility
and propose that observing the first two stages of the hype cycle lets us predict two,
2 A normal distribution can be fully specified by its mean and standard deviation
4rather than one, standard deviations in the adoption cycle. With our third proposition, we
postulate that competitive benefits become asymptotically zero by the time the new
technology has reached three standard deviations in the adoption cycle, i.e., the
approximate center of the adoption cycle.
We demonstrate the empirical estimation of expected duration of competitive advantage
for two technologies (cloud computing and ERP). For cloud computing estimation, we
use three sources (proxy for expectations): Google Trends to capture web search interest,
LexisNexis to capture news stories with focus in cloud computing, and Gartner Hype
Cycles for emerging technologies. All three sources produce comparable results. For
ERP, we rely on prior literature to show that our predictions are consistent with evidence
from empirical studies.
The mapping/synthesis based framework and proposed methodology are not without
limitations. Relying on hype cycle to generate predictions may lead to false estimates. In
our discussion we present two examples: The first one shows that our methodology will
not work when dealing with an emerging technology, such as cryptocurrency, which goes
through multiple hype cycles. The second one, builds on the fact that theoretically a bell
shaped distribution has no limits. Which means that selection of commencement of the
new technology will affect the prediction. We demonstrate this by examining the hype
cycle of customer relationship management (CRM) systems. Depending on the chosen
commencement year of CRM one would arrive at dramatically different results.
The study contributes to two major and distinct streams of literature (technology
diffusion and resource based view) by providing a mapping/synthesis based framework
and a relatively simple way to implement the derived propositions. The implementation
could be useful to researchers interested in technology adoption and IT business value, in
order to generate an initial benchmark of the expected duration due to technology
adoption. For example, Hendricks et al. (2007, 70) state that:
“ … The existing literature provides little guidance on what should be the
appropriate length of the post-implementation period over which one should
measure the benefit of investments in ES. There does seem to be an agreement that
5the benefits will be felt over a long time period. Given this, we choose a three-year
post-implementation period for ERP, SCM, and CRM applications. Overall, we
examine the changes in financial performance over a five-year period for ERP
systems (a two-year implementation period and a three-year post-implementation
period), and a four year period for SCM and CRM systems (a one-year
implementation period and a three-year post-implementation period).”
This benchmark can be used to gauge the incremental effect of firm specific attributes,
such as IT capability and management skills, on a firm’s ability to sustain its technology
adoption related competitive advantage.
The study has practical implications. First, it would be useful for mindful adopters of
technological innovations (Swanson and Ramiller 2004) and firms that have developed a
sustained reputation for their IT innovation capability (Stratopoulos and Lim 2010; Lim
et al. 2011) to select investments in emerging technologies that could provide the
maximum contribution to their existing competitive advantage. Second, generating
predictions regarding the expected duration of competitive advantage could be useful to
financial managers trying to estimate the net present value of an investment in an
emerging technology. The estimated duration could be used to discount net cash flows
associated with this investment. Third, the same estimation could be useful for investors
and analysts trying to value the market reaction to a firm’s decision to adopt the new
technology. The estimated duration would be used to discount future earnings. Finally, it
would be useful to the top management teams of firms supplying the new technology, as
it would allow them to calibrate their strategy for the growth and maturity stage of their
product’s life cycle.
2. Background and Synthesis
2.1 Technology adoption theory
According to Rogers (1995) adoption of a new technology by individuals or firms tends
to follow an approximate bell shaped distribution (See Figure 1). Rogers (1995) argues
that adoption of new technologies follows the bell shaped distribution because of the
cumulative influence upon potential adopters from peer networks. In business terms, this
means that the documented profitability and efficiency gains of firms that were the first
6to adopt would force non-adopters to either follow in order to catch up or be in a position
of competitive disadvantage. Using the properties of the bell shaped distribution
(empirical rule), Rogers (1995) proposed the following five categories of technology
adopters:3
Innovators are the first to adopt a new technology. The adoption of the new technology is
associated with a high level of uncertainty for two reasons. First, the technology is at the
experimental stage, which means that its functionality may not have been fully
developed. Second, it is quite possible that adopters may not have a clear picture of how
to integrate the new technology with their existing processes, and more importantly, the
expected benefits may not be clear. Therefore, the advantage of making such an
investment ahead of the vast majority of competitors is balanced by the high risk that the
investment may fail to deliver positive and significant payoffs. In general, innovators are
firms with a high appetite for risk and strong financial position. The latter enables them
to afford potential losses associated with high risk projects.
The second group, early adopters, though not as risk seeking as the innovators, still have
to deal with relatively high levels of uncertainty. The technology is not at the
experimental stage anymore, but this does not mean that it has reached technological
maturity. Typically, early adopters have been able to observe and learn from the
successes and failures of innovators. They can leverage this experience to manage the
risk associated with implementation of the new technology and increase the likelihood of
successful business assimilation. The role of early adopters is pivotal: their success will
trigger mass adoption (early majority), while their failure means the end of the new
technology. The early Majority will join the adoption process at the stage when the risks
have been mitigated, but while the benefits of the adoption are still relatively high.
Collectively these three groups represent approximately 50% of potential adopters.
3 Obviously the classification is only applicable in the case for successful technological innovations. There
are many innovations that fail to go beyond the innovator or early innovator stage.
7Figure 1:  Rogers Innovation Adoption Cycle
The last two groups - late majority and laggards- represent the remaining 50%. The
former reflects adopters that invest in the new technology as a result of strong peer
pressure. From a business standpoint, this means that the late majority adopters have
already realized that its peers have gained a competitive advantage, and investment in the
new technology is a necessity if they want to catch up with their competitors. There are
several reasons why laggards are the last to adopt. The role of the new technology in
their operations may be tangential, they may simply be hostile to new technologies, or
very conservative in the way they think and operate.
Obviously, the mean and standard deviation needed to specify the exact shape of an
adoption cycle are specific to each new technology. To acquire the additional specificity
needed, in the following section, we turn our attention to the Hype Cycle.
2.2 Technology life cycle (Gartner Hype Cycle)
The Hype Cycle was developed by Gartner, a technology consulting company, and is
defined as follows (Gartner n.d.): ... A Hype Cycle is a graphic representation of the
maturity, adoption and business application of specific technologies.
8Figure 2: Gartner Hype Cycle (Source: Wikipedia)
According to Gartner, the life cycle of nascent technologies goes through the following
five stages (Figure 2): The emerging technology starts with a technological breakthrough
or a proof-of-concept, which triggers public interest in the new technology (Innovation
Trigger). The new technology is still at the experimental stage and no viable business
applications have been developed yet. Typically, the innovation trigger is followed by
increased publicity. Dramatized success stories of selected adopters tend to ignore the
technology’s technical limitations and exaggerates the potential benefits. The technology
enters the period of unrealistic expectations (Peak of Inflated Expectations). Some of the
innovators adopting the technology at this stage are motivated by fad and have
unrealistic expectations.
Given that the technology is at an exploratory stage with no explicit and proven way to
monetize it, the majority of first generation adopters fail to extract value from their
investment and the initial hype is followed by the Trough of Disillusionment. While,
some of the developers and adopters exit, a hard core group continues trying to improve
the technology and figure out ways of extracting value from the new technology. Overall
adoption remains at less than 5%. Gradually, new instances of how the new technology
can deliver tangible benefits emerge, renewing the interest and spawning a new
9generation of adopters (Slope of Enlightenment). Their success provides proof that the
technology is viable and generates benefits, thus mainstream adoption takes off (Plateau
of Productivity).
Position of an emerging technology to a specific stage in the Gartner Hype Cycle is not
based on hard evidence or scientific analysis. It simply represents the perceptions of
Gartner analysts. Given the focus of the hype cycle on business applications (i.e., the
plateau of productivity), each technology showing in the annual hype cycle of emerging
technologies is accompanied with an estimate regarding the number of years it would
take for the technology to reach the plateau of productivity.
While the hype cycle provides estimates regarding the time it would take for an emerging
technology to reach the plateau of productivity, it does not provide the additional
information needed to establish the expected duration of competitive advantage due to
adoption. In the following section, we introduce the resource based view in order to
complete the last piece of the proposed mapping/synthesis framework.
2.3 Technology adoption and competitive advantage
From a strategic management standpoint, firms adopt emerging technologies in an
attempt to improve or simply sustain their competitive position. Ceteris paribus, if all
firms competing in a market have access to the same technology, they are likely to be in
competitive parity. Access to a technology that would allow one of these firms to
perform different activities than its competitors or perform the same activities at a lower
cost would give this firm a competitive advantage. This is the main premise behind RBV,
i.e., the distribution of resources and capabilities among competing firms is a key
determinant of a firm’s relative performance. Only resources and capabilities, which are
valuable and heterogeneously distributed among competing firms, are a source of
competitive advantage. The more persistent the heterogeneity, the longer the duration of
a competitive advantage. More specifically, we can assess the implications of adoption of
an emerging technology on a firm’s competitive position using the (Mata et al. 1995)
RBV framework (Figure 3).
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Typically, a firm would adopt a new technology expecting that this would increase its
value (i.e., the expected net present value of the technology adoption is positive).
However, the adoption of an emerging technology is risky and it may generate negative
expected payoffs. For example, the firm may fail to implement successfully, the
technology may not be stable, or the firm may not be able to assimilate the new
technology. If we assume that all firms were originally in a position of competitive
parity, the investment in a technology that is not valuable is likely to put the adopting
firm in a position of relative disadvantage. However, if the technology is valuable, the
question becomes: Is it heterogeneously distributed among competing firms?
Figure 3: Resource Based View Framework
The heterogeneity of a new technology among potential adopters would depend on host
of technology and firm specific factors. For example, if a supplier can readily provide
stable version of the new technology to all potential adopters at a relatively low cost, the
technology would be valuable but not heterogeneous. The diffusion of the new
technology would be rapid among all firms in this market and adopters would simply
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maintain their competitive parity. However, it is highly unlikely that a supplier would
achieve this level of maturity instantly and/or adopting firms would have access to all
resources and capabilities needed to successfully adopt and assimilate the new
technology. Therefore, the next issue becomes that of duration of heterogeneity. If the
heterogeneity is quickly dissipating the adopting firm will enjoy only a temporary
competitive advantage. Else, the advantage is sustainable.
According to the resource based view, there are several factors that could affect the
duration of heterogeneity. Adopting firms can leverage a combination of technology
specific attributes with firm specific resources and capabilities to raise barriers to
imitation or isolating mechanisms.4 Causal ambiguity and path dependence are two such
isolating mechanisms. The former refers to fact that imitators would have to understand
the way that the new technology has been assimilated and how it contributes to a
competitor’s advantage before they can replicate it.  The later reflects the importance of
choices made during the early stages of a project that have significant implications on
current choices, decisions, and expected outcomes. This means that in order to arrive to
the current status of a competitor's competitive position, its peers will have to take the
same path the competitor has taken. Therefore, the stronger the causal ambiguity and/or
path dependence the longer the duration of heterogeneity.
Based on the above we conclude that the number of firms that have access to a resource,
and the time it takes for firms that have no access to this resource to acquire it are the
two proxies for relative competitive value of the resource. The role of the number of
firms can be understood by drawing on microeconomic theory. In the extreme case that
only one firm has access to a resource, the owner will behave as a virtual monopolist and
extract the maximum level of economic profits. The monopolist has a competitive
advantage. The other extreme is that of perfect competition - all firms in the market have
access to the same resource and none of them earns economic profits. Therefore, when
the number of firms that has access to this resource reaches a perfectly competitive
4 See Dehning and Stratopoulos (2003) for a list of barriers to imitation and isolating
mechanisms.
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equilibrium, adoption is valuable but it does not yield competitive payoffs for its
adopters. If the number of firms that possess a resource or capability is relatively small
(less than the number of firms needed to generate perfectly competitive equilibrium in a
market), the resource or capability is rare and a potential source of competitive
advantage. In addition, if competitors find it difficult to acquire, substitute, or imitate
these resources/capabilities, then these firms enjoy a competitive advantage. If the
number of firms that have access to a resource is small, and remains small for a relatively
long time, these firms will enjoy a sustainable competitive advantage (Figure 4 – left
panel). Else, the advantage is temporary (Figure 4 – right panel).
2.4 Synthesis – propositions
In order to generate predictions regarding the expected duration of the competitive
advantage for the average adopting firm; we need to specify the expected mean and
standard deviation of the technology related adoption cycle, and establish an approximate
adoption threshold that could be associated with no competitive advantage. In the
following paragraphs, we will propose a mapping between the adoption cycle and hype
cycle of an emerging technology in order to identify the two parameters (mean and
Figure 4: Number of Firms at Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium
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standard deviation), and leverage resource based view to establish the threshold of no
competitive gains.
Proposition 1a: According to the adoption cycle, innovators are willing to adopt the new
technology while still at the experimental stage. From the description of the hype cycle,
we know that the new technology remains at the experimental stage during the innovation
trigger stage and peak of inflated expectations. Given that the innovator’s adoption
period reflects approximately one standard deviation in the adoption cycle, we propose
that the time from the introduction of the new technology until the end of the peak of
inflated expectations reflects approximately one standard deviation (Figure 4).
Proposition 1b: While innovators are willing to take high risk, early adopters will not
adopt until some of the technological uncertainty and business related uncertainty has
been removed. Both of these kinds of uncertainty will start being mitigated as the
technology goes through the trough of disillusionment and the slope of enlightenment.
Therefore, innovators and early adopters are likely to adopt the new technology up to the
late stages of the slope of enlightenment. This provides the foundation for proposition 1b,
i.e., that the period from the introduction of the new technology up to the late stages of
the slope of enlightenment reflects a period of approximately two standard deviations in
the adoption cycle.
Proposition 2: The adoption rate is likely to change due to several technological and
economic factors. For example, the adoption of technology A is likely to slow down, if
there is a new technology B that performs better than A. On the other hand the adoption
of A is likely to accelerate, if it can serve as the foundation (prerequisite) for the adoption
of a new lucrative technology C. Adoption rate is likely to accelerate when the
technology is hitched to an economic bubble and/or bandwagon effect. To account for
this possibility, we propose that in cases that adoption is related to such factors, the first
two stages of the hype cycle lets us predict two, rather than one, standard deviations in
the adoption cycle.
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Proposition 3: The targeted population of potential adopters is comprised of firms, which
are expecting that adoption would generate a positive net present value. The relative
expected benefits (competitive advantage) would depend on how many firms have
already adopted the technology. The competitive advantage will asymptotically approach
zero as the number of adopting firms is approaching the number of firms in a perfectly
Figure 5: Propositions
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competitive market. According to adoption cycle, late majority would adopt the new
technology because of strong competitive pressure. This means that the competitive
benefits will start getting smaller (economic profits will start approaching zero) by the
end of the early majority. Therefore, the number of technology adopting firms will
approach the number of firms in a perfectly competitive equilibrium by the time that late
majority of adopting firms has started adopting the new technology, i.e., the average
(mean) time of the adoption cycle.
3. Methodology an Estimation Process
The main premise behind an attempt to estimate the duration of an emerging technology
adoption related competitive advantage is that of establishing whether the emerging
technology would diffuse rapidly or slowly. According to Rogers (1995) there are several
factors that would affect the shape of technology adoption. Arguably, the most significant
factor is potential adopter’s expectations regarding the value adding contribution. The
higher the perceived advantage by potential adopters, the faster will be the adoption rate.
Other factors include the perceived compatible with potential adopters’ needs, level of
complexity in implementation of the new technology, ability to experiment with the new
technology, and information or evidence regarding the implementation obstacles or
factors that lead to higher success from existing adopters.5 Our goal is not to examine
such attributes, but try to introduce some proxy that would capture the expected adoption
cycle.
Given that the main underlying variable that changes over time and thus determines
diffusion rate is potential innovators’ assessment of future expected value, we follow the
suggestion of  Fenn and Raskino (2008) and use the number of articles in newspapers and
magazines as a proxy for measuring expectations. In the following sections we explore
the use of Google Trends and LexisNexis to generate a proxy for expected value.
5 There is an extensive literature that has looked at the attributes of emerging technologies that make some
technologies more attractive and diffuse more rapidly than others. For a review of this literature see
Fichman (2000).
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3.1 Predictive analysis: Google Trends & LexisNexis
Google Trends is a public service offered by Google that shows how often a specific
search-term has been used relative to the total search-volume by geographic region and
over time. The results are shown in a graph or tabulated. In the graph the horizontal axis
represents time (starting from 2004), and the vertical axis is the relative popularity of the
search term in a given geographic region and time frame.6 One would expect that the
search interest would be positively correlated with the expected value of the emerging
technology. In the following paragraphs, we would focus on one emerging technology
(cloud computing) and limit our search interest in one geographic region (United States).
Cloud Computing has been described as the delivery of computing as a service rather
than a product. It enables on demand access to a shared pool of configurable computing
resources such as network servers, data storage, and software applications.7 Software as a
6 According to Google Trends, “Numbers represent search interest relative to the highest point on the chart.
If at most 10% of searches for the given region and time frame were for ‘pizza,’ we'd consider this 100.
This doesn't convey absolute search volume.”
7 Mell P, Grance T. 2011. The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing. Recommendations of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology. Special Publication, National Institute of Standards and Technology
- U.S. Department of Commerce, Gaithersburg, MD: 7. Available at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf. Key words related to cloud computing
Figure 6: Cloud Computing: Google Trends (left) and LexisNexis (right)
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service (SaaS) has been around since the late nineties. However, the more recent version
of cloud computing – i.e., one that includes Platform as a Service (PaaS). Infrastructure
as a Service (IaaS) - was ‘formally’ introduced with Amazon’s introduction of Elastic
Compute Cloud in August of 2006 (Hof 2006).
For the generation of expectation proxy, we have used Google trends and the keyword
“cloud computing.”8 The Google Trends results (Figure 6 – left pane) show that, while
cloud computing was introduced in the summer of 2006, the public started being
interested in this in the fall of 2007. Interest has been rising in the following years,
reaching its peak in 2011 and starting to decline by the end of the same year. Based on
this, we estimate that the innovation trigger and peak of inflated expectations lasted from
2006 to 2011.
Therefore, according to proposition 1a, we estimate that the standard deviation of the
technology adoption cycle of cloud computing is approximately 5 years. Observing the
Google trend in the remaining years, we see that it has entered into the trough of
disillusionment in 2012 and kept declining in 2013, showing some signs of stability in
2014. Therefore, we can postulate that it may have been transitioning from trough to
slope of enlightenment in 2014 and 2015. Unfortunately, the evidence is not adequate to
apply proposition 1b, and establish a second point of reference/generate some additional
evidence regarding the standard deviation of the adoption cycle of cloud computing.
The number of news stories has been suggested as another proxy for the future expected
value of an emerging technology (Fenn and Raskino (2008)). We used LexisNexis and
focused our search to news stories where some variation of the term “cloud computing”
appeared in the headline, highlights, lead paragraph or abstract of a story. To maintain
consistency with Google Trend, we specified the same geographic region (USA) and
service models: Software as a Service (SaaS). Platform as a Service (PaaS). Infrastructure as a Service
(IaaS).
8 The addition of terms such as IaaS, Infrastructure as a Service, PaaS, and Platform as a Service did not
produce a significant volume of search results to alter the overall results. I have removed these terms from
the analysis to simplify the analysis and graph.
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same time period (2004-2015). Following the same approach as the one used by Google
Trends, we created an index of news articles (i.e., report count as percentage of max
value). The results shown in Figure 6 (right panel) show a similar pattern to the one from
Google Trends, i.e., the number of new stories peaked in 2011.
For additional support, we turn into the Garner generated hype cycles over this period.
Analyzing hype cycles from 2004 to 2015 we find the following: Cloud computing
appears as an emerging technology in 2008 and remains in the hype cycles until 2014.
Over these years it has the following classification: 2008 on the innovation trigger, 2009-
2011at the peak of expectations, and 2012-2014 into the trough of disillusionment. Cloud
computing has been removed from the Gartner’s 2015 hype cycle of emerging
technologies and has been replaced with “Hybrid cloud computing”, which remains
classified in the trough. Overall, the results of the Gartner hype cycles are consistent with
our findings from Google Trends and LexisNexis.  Based on the above, we estimate that
the cloud computing would reach its 50% cumulative adoption rate by the early 2020s.
Summary results in Table 1, show that it would cease producing relative competitive
benefits for its adopters after the early 2020s.
While the triangulation of cloud computing results provides some comfort these
predictions cannot be currently verified. In addition to this; adoption of cloud computing,
at least to this point in time, does not seem to have been influenced by any other factors.9
Therefore, we cannot apply proposition 2. To mitigate these limitations, in our next
section, we are going to apply the proposed methodology on the adoption of Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP) systems. ERP is a mature technology and its adoption
coincided with a market bubble and a technological threat.
9 The rise of data analytics, big data, and the internet of things may change this.
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3.2 Historical Evidence: Expected Duration due to ERP Adoption
ERP systems, when successfully implemented, can link all primary and support activities
within a firm (i.e., manufacturing, logistics, sales, procurement, finance, human
resources, etc.) into a comprehensive and integrated system that is based on a shared
database. In other words, an ERP can work as the conduit that connects all primary and
support activities within the company' value chain, and integrate its supply chain. The
expected benefits typically include reduction in working capital, and access to more
accurate information faster about suppliers, customers, and employees. Firms that can
leverage this information to support their business strategy are bound to reap significant
benefits from their investment. However, the investment in an ERP system is the largest,
most demanding and complex IS implementation that the firm will undertake. As a result
the risk of failure during implementation has been very high. In some cases the results
can be catastrophic. It has been argued that the 1996 bungled ERP implementation of
FoxMeyer contributed to the firm's bankruptcy.
The earlier version of ERP systems trace their roots in material requirements planning
(MRP) systems, which have been around for several decades. However, the modern
manifestation of ERP systems has been associated with SAP and more specifically the
release of SAP R/3 in 1992. Assigning the commencement of ERP systems to the early
nineties is consistent with evidence from ERP studies that report announcements of ERP
adopting firms (e.g., Nicolaou et al. 2003; Hendricks et al. 2007). Therefore, it stands to
reason that we can assign the early nineties (1991-1992) as the commencement of ERP
systems.
Years Adopters CumulativeAdoption
Competitive
Implications
Expected
Duration
2006-2011 Innovators 2.5% Competitive advantage ~ 15 years
2011-2016 Early adopters 16% Competitive advantage ~ 10 years
2016-2021 Early majority 50% Competitive advantage ~ 5 years
2021-2026 Late majority 84% Parity NA
2026-2031 Laggards 100% Parity NA
Table 1: Cloud Computing Predictions
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Adoption rate was relatively slow in the early 1990s, but it took off during the second
half when firms realized that the Y2K problem was posing a threat on existing legacy
systems. Many companies saw this as an opportunity to replace their legacy systems
(Anderson et al. 2003). This adoption pattern has been captured in the ERP hype cycle
generated by Wang (2010) in Figure 7 – left panel. The right panel of figure 7 shows the
number of ERP related articles in LexisNexis from 1990-2015.
Figure 7: ERP Adoption: Wang 2010 (left) – LexisNexis  (right)
If we were to ignore the pivotal role of Y2K in the adoption of ERP systems, we would
have been inclined to conclude that the period from approximately 1991-1992 to 1999
reflects one standard deviation in the adoption cycle (Proposition 1a). Assuming a
standard deviation of 8 years would have let us to conclude that the average adopting
firm would have achieved a competitive advantage that would not have ceased till
approximately 2020. However, incorporation of the Y2K effect, suggests that the late
nineties mark the “take off” point of mainstream ERP adoption or entry to the plateau of
productivity in the hype cycle. This means that the period from 1991-92 to 1999 marks
two standard deviation in the adoption cycle. This is consistent with industry reports that
raised the number of adopting firms worldwide to at least 30,000 (Mabert et al. 2001).
Therefore, assuming a standard deviation of four year and weighing the percentage of
firms adopting in each of the first three adopting groups (empirical rule), we could
estimate that the average duration would be around three years:
0.025*12+0.135*8+0.34*4=2.74 years
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This is consistent with the three year period that has been used in empirical ERP studies
(e.g., Hendricks et al. 2007; Anderson et al. 2003).10 Hendricks et al. (2007) found that
firms that invested in ERP systems had higher ROA than matched portfolio that excludes
ERP adopters. The study treats firms that have made announcements before 1998 as early
adopters,11 and conclude that they “... may have benefited more from ERP implementation
when compared to later adopters” (p. 77). Anderson et al. (2003) found strong market
reaction to spending on ERP adoption.
We would like to close this discussion by reiterating our previous caveat, which is
supported by several ERP studies, that the expected competitive benefits due to ERP
adoption are dependent on a host of firm specific (organizational) and external factors
(e.g., Nicolaou and Bhattacharya 2006; Nicolaou and Bhattacharya 2008). In other
words, the prediction is for the average adopting firm.
4. Limitations
The problem with any attempt to generate a predictive framework is that of trying to
strike a balance between detail and usefulness. The temptation in the context of this study
would have been to try to incorporate additional technology and adopter specific
attributes. For example, cloud computing as an emerging technology is very general. At a
minimum one could consider three version of IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS and observe different
adoption patterns.
Approaching the same technology from an adopters standpoint, there are numerous firm
specific factors that will define the firm specific duration of a competitive advantage for
each adopter. For example, the firm specific expected competitive advantage due to
emerging technology adoption would depend on such factors as: the adopting firm’s
business strategy (product differentiator or cost leader); the role of technology in the
10 The study of Tian and Xu (2015) uses five years but their choice is driven by standard research practice
in the estimation of dependent variable rather than expectations for duration of competitive benefits of ERP
adoption. They use five years to estimate standard deviation of annual earnings as a proxy for firm risk.
11 Please note that the definition of early adopters used by Hendricks et al. (2007) includes both innovators
and early adopters in Figure 1.
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firm’s IT strategy (support, factory, strategic, turnaround); other investments that the firm
has made in complementary to the adopting technology resources and capabilities; and,
the overall organizational IT capability. Similarly, the duration will be affected by
external factors such as the reaction and IT capability of its competitors. Trying to
incorporate every single one of these factors is beyond the scope of our study and it
would make the proposed framework unyielding as Borges’ (1972) map. Nevertheless,
within the scope of our study, there are two limitations that we will need to address.
4.1 Multiple hype cycles: cryptocurrencies
Some technologies may go through several hype cycles before they enter the slope of
enlightenment and plateau of productivity (Fenn 2007). Obviously, in the case of an
emerging technology that goes through multiple cycles, applying proposition 1a or 2
immediately after the first hype cycle, would generate inconsistent prediction of expected
duration. In the following paragraphs, we are going to consider the example of an
emerging technology that has been through multiple hype cycles.
Cryptocurrency is a form of digital currency that is not controlled by any central bank. It
uses encryption techniques to regulate the issue of new units and verification of transfer
of funds. Although, there are several cryptocurrencies available, Bitcoin is the most
popular. Cryptocurrency as an emerging technology, was first introduced in Gartner’s
hype cycle in 2014, and reappeared in 2015. Both years, the cryptocurrency was placed
near the end of the peak of inflated expectations, and it was coded with a dark blue dot,
an indication that the technology could take between 5 to 10 years before it could reach
the plateau of productivity. Given that the starting point for the new technology is
approximately 2009, we could have generated the following predictions: 1. Bitcoin has
completed approximately one standard deviation in its adoption cycle. Therefore its
standard deviation is approximately 5 to 6 years. 2. Based on this, we could have
predicted that it would reach its plateau of productivity 2020 or 2021. 3. It would have
been adopted by approximately half of the targeted population and cease producing
competitive benefits by 2025 or 2026.
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However, an analysis based on Google trends, using the keywords “cryptocurrency” and
“bitcoin”, shows a different story. As shown in Figure 8, the search interest shows three
spikes (hype cycles). The first one is approximately in the end of 2011, the second in
2013, and the most recent one in 2014. The interest in cryptocurrency seems to get
stronger each time. The most recent one seems to coincide with Gartner’s Hype Cycle.
However, we don't know whether cryptocurrency will go from disillusionment to
enlightenment and plateau of productivity or simply enter another hype cycle.
Therefore, any prediction regarding adoption and expected competitive gains should be
seen in the backdrop of these limitations. Last but not least, any prediction about bitcoin
are likely to be influenced or influence the adoption of another technology, i.e.,
blockchain. A possible extension of our methodology would be to consider clusters of
technologies which are likely to influence each other.
Figure 8: Google Trends – cryptocurrency
4.2 Commencement of emerging technology
Theoretically, the normal distribution has no limits. This means that the selection of the
starting point in the context of an adoption cycle is critical and its selection can lead to
erroneous results. For example, the peak of expectations for customer relationship
management (CRM) systems came in the late 1990s. However, the selection of a starting
point would depend on our definition of CRMs. If we were to associate the development
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of loyalty cards, i.e., the attempt to create a database for the systematic capture of
customer related information, as the manifestation of a CRM then the origin should be
traced back to 1981 when  American Airlines introduced its loyalty card (Fenn and
Raskino 2008). This would mean that one standard deviation would be close to 20 years.
Thus firms that had implemented a CRM in 1999, would have expected their competitive
advantage to last another forty years!
On the other hand, if we were to focus on the development of the CRM as a technology
itself, the starting point could have been in the early 1990s. Thus indicating a standard
deviation of 10 years, and the advantage for firms investing in 1990 would have expected
to last for another twenty years. Finally, one last piece of information should be added
into this puzzle. The peak of expectations for CRM, coincided with the internet hype and
the introduction of SalesForce.com, which made possible the adoption of CRM as a
service. Thus, the 1999 should be treated as a take-off point (entry to the plateau of
productivity) for CRM, which means that from the early 1990s to the 1999, we have two
standard deviations. Therefore, a firm that had adopted a CRM in 1999 should have
expected to see its competitive advantage evaporate by the mid-2000s. The last prediction
is more realistic and consistent with an observation that loyalty cards had lost their appeal
by the mid-2000s (Fenn and Raskino 2008).
5. Concluding Remarks
The study proposed a synthesis of two major and distinct streams of literature
(technology diffusion and resource based view) in order to develop a framework for
generating predictions related to the expected duration of a competitive advantage due to
adoption of an emerging technology. One of the main advantages and contribution of this
study is the fact that resulting propositions are relatively easy to implement. Researchers
and professional who want to explore the implications of our propositions in the context
of a new technology can do this using readily available tools such as the Google Trends.
The caveat emptor is that this simplicity has its limitations, therefore, researchers and
professional should use their domain specific knowledge to supplement these predictions.
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As a final thought, and as a reminded of the tradeoffs of all studies like this one, we
should keep in mind Borges’ (1972) message from his essay “On Exactitude of Science
“. . . In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that … the
Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and
which coincided point for point with it. The following Generations, who were not so fond
of the Study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast map was
Useless,.”12
12 The quote is form the Wikipedia.
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